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A critical review of the Canadian Judicial Council’s Inquiry Committee Report1 
on Justices Hart, Jones and Macdonald of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal cannot 
fault the unanimous conclusion of the committee members that the three judges 
in question should not be removed from office. Nor can the Supreme Court of 
Canada be faulted for its conclusion in Hickman v. MacKeigan2 that it is a 
violation of the principle of judicial independence to require judges to disclose 
information about their deliberations. Yet, the results of these two correct 
conclusions have limited our ability to draw lessons from the Royal Commission 
on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution;3 lessons crucial to the understanding and 
development of concepts of judicial independence and impartiality in Canada.
It is ironic that the Inquiry Committee Report, reprinted in this Journal, is one 
of the most important official responses to follow the publication of the Royal 
Commission Report, since the circumstances surrounding the work of the Inquiry 
Committee prevented it from considering some of the Royal Commission’s most 
serious criticisms of the judiciary. In fact, none of the three judges, who were the 
objects of the Inquiry, were even mentioned by name in the Royal Commission 
Report, with the exception of a one sentence reference to a 1961 letter written 
long before the murder of Sandy Seale and the events that followed by Mr. Justice 
Malachi Jones while he was Senior Solicitor in the Nova Scotia Attorney General’s 
Department.4 The two judges who were criticized by name, Chief Justice Ian 
MacKeigan and Justice Leonard Pace, both sat on the controversial R. v. Marshall 
decision,5 but their conduct was not examined by the Inquiry Committee. The 
reason is straightforward enough. While the Canadian Judicial Council was asked 
by the Nova Scotia Attorney General on February 9, 1990, to hold an Inquiry, 
Pace’s resignation “due to ill health” was accepted on April 5 and MacKeigan 
retired on April 11 having reached the compulsory retirement age of 75, well
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before the Inquiry Committee began its hearings on June 4 in Halifax.6
Compounding the irony is the fact that while the Inquiry Committee focused 
on the internal deliberations of the Court of Appeal panel that heard and decided 
the Marshall Reference between December 1982 and May 1983, the criticisms of 
Pace and MacKeigan by name did not. Pace was criticized inter alia for having sat 
on the Reference while MacKeigan was criticized for not properly using his 
administrative authority over judicial assignments to exclude Pace from the 
Reference panel.7 These fundamental and important issues were therefore 
beyond the scope of the Inquiry Committee.
Thus, the Marshall affair and its aftermath have left unanswered, and in some 
cases unexamined, a number of important questions about both the independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary; at the individual level of the particular judge as 
well as at the administrative level of the court as a public institution. The present 
comment can only make initial assertions and urge their wider consideration.
Discussions With Government
The five judges who sat on the Reference were not immune from scrutiny as to 
whether they had discussed the Marshall case with executive officials from either 
the Provincial or Federal Government, or both. While this dimension of Hickman 
v. MacKeigan was touched on by Mr. Justice Cory in the Supreme Court of 
Canada,8 it appears that neither the Royal Commission nor various counsel 
distinguished between asking judges what they discussed among themselves and 
asking judges what they discussed with government officials. Since discussions 
between judges and government officials about the merits of a pending case are 
inappropriate and violate judicial independence when they take place outside the 
courtroom and not in the presence of opposing counsel, it would have been 
difficult for the five judges to invoke the principle of judicial independence as a 
basis for refusing to answer questions about any such discussions.
Even if it is successfully argued that the principle of judicial independence 
cannot be used to shield judges from questions concerning actions that violate the 
principle, such as discussing the merits of a pending case with government officials, 
those questions cannot be asked indiscriminately. If the Royal Commission had 
no reason to believe that any of the five judges had discussed the Marshall case 
with government officials outside the courtroom without the presence of opposing
6ReP°rt of Inquiry Members Richard CJ., Laycraft, CJ., Abella and Bellemare, supra, note 1 at 1 
[hereinafter the Majority Report].
1'ibid. at 16.
counsel, asking them to appear and put their denials on the record would 
constitute a form of inquisition inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. 
In the present case, however, evidence before the Royal Commission was sufficient 
to allow questions to be put to Justice Pace and Chief Justice MacKeigan.
Testimony showed that the Chief Justice was advised “as a matter of courtesy” 
by Jacques Demers, Executive Assistant to then Minister of Justice, Jean Chrétien, 
that the proposed Reference would be forthcoming.9 While the initial contact 
may be seen as a normal part of the administrative procedures that flow from 
MacKeigan’s responsibilities as Chief Justice, the Royal Commission Report 
accepts as fact the federal official’s testimony that MacKeigan raised legal issues 
“in later conversation” that led the federal Justice Department to alter the basis 
on which the Reference was requested.10 The Royal Commission Report 
contains no evidence that MacKeigan was motivated by anything other than a 
desire to be helpful, but the Royal Commission concluded that it was “regrettable 
that officials in the Department of Justice were influenced by the views of the 
Chief Justice in determining the final form of the Reference.”11 Whatever the 
merits of the Chief Justice’s views, it is inappropriate for a judge to offer advice 
to government in private on how to litigate a matter in the judge’s court. Given 
this evidence, MacKeigan could have been required to appear before the Royal 
Commission to respond to questions about these and other discussions he had with 
government officials respecting the Marshall case.
Mr. Justice Pace was Nova Scotia’s Attorney General in 1971 at the time of 
Marshall’s original conviction and appeal. It is hard to imagine that he would not 
have discussed the merits of the case at that time and formed an opinion. 
Testimony before the Royal Commission indicates that he had quite likely done 
so. A provincial Government lawyer noted that in a private conversation he had 
with Pace “that he [Pace] knew from the time that poor old Mr. Ebsary [the man 
ultimately convicted in Sandy Seale’s death] was charged that he could not be 
guilty.”12 The lawyer, “a solicitor with the Halifax office of the [Nova Scotia] 
Department of Attorney General...was summoned to Justice Pace’s office, where 
he was severely admonished for having raised the issue of bias” in a subsequent 
appeal arising from Ebsary5s third trial.13 Given this evidence, Pace could, and 
should, have been required to appear before the Royal Commission and asked 
about any discussions that he may have had with government officials about the 
Marshall case following his appointment to the bench. The implications of his
9Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 114.
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13Ibid.
behaviour for public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary are particularly 
serious.
None of these issues were dealt with by the Inquiry Committee, since neither 
of the judges were still on the bench at the time it began its work. As a result, the 
Inquiry Committee limited its conclusions in Part III to questions that “would go 
specifically into the decisional process of an appellate court,” and into “private 
deliberations about, and composition of, Reasons for Judgment.”14 These 
questions, the Inquiry Committee rightly concluded, “would strike at the very heart 
of judicial independence.”15 But what about questions regarding private 
discussions of a case between judges and government officials? Avoiding these 
questions could undermine judicial independence as surely as asking improper 
ones.
Fiscal Independence
The lack of administrative independence for the judiciary threatens to compound 
the appearance of bias in matters such as the Reference, since one of the most 
important effects of the Court of Appeal’s reasons was on the financial liability of 
the Nova Scotia Government.
Throughout the commentaries on the Nova Scotia Court of Appeals judgment 
in the Reference, the statement that any “miscarriage of justice is, however, more 
apparent than real” has been subject to the strongest criticism.16 The Royal 
Commission found:
that the Court’s gratuitous comments in the last pages of its decision created 
serious difficulties for Donald Marshall, Jr., both in terms of his ability to negotiate 
compensation for his wrongful conviction and also in terms of public acceptance 
of his acquittal.17
In support of its conclusion, the Royal Commission quoted from two judgments 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hickman. First, Justice Cory, dissenting in 
part, stated:
Upon his acquittal, Marshall was eventually paid some $250,000 by the Province 
of Nova Scotia and in return he executed a complete release of all claims he might 
have had against the government. Not unexpectedly it appears that the derogatory 
comments made by the Court of Appeal quoted above had an adverse impact on
MMajority Report, supra, note 1 at 22.
^Ibid. at 23.
16The Reference, supra, note 5 at 321-322.
11 Royal Commission, vol. 1, supra, note 3 at 116.
the quantum of compensation which was paid to Marshall.18
Second, Madame Justice McLachlin, speaking for the majority in Hickman stated 
that *‘[i]t is evident from the materials before the Court, however, that the 
comments of the Court of Appeal had an impact on the quantum of that 
payment.”19 Chief Justice McEachern, the Inquiry Committee Chair agreed with 
these conclusions. “I have no doubt that the consequences just quoted from the 
Royal Commission Report were accurate,” McEachern wrote, even though he 
disagreed with both the Royal Commission and the majority of the Inquiry 
Committee about the validity of their criticisms of the Appeal Court’s written 
reasons.
The unanimous linkage of the Court of Appeal’s dicta in the Reference to the 
reduced quantum of Marshall’s compensation, open that Court’s action to a public 
perception of bias that stems from the way our courts are funded and adminis­
tered. The cost of administering the superior courts of Nova Scotia (save the 
salaries and travel expenses of the judges) is part of the budget of the provincial 
Department of the Attorney General. Thus, provision for support personnel, 
supplies and equipment is dependent on internal financial priorities of that 
Department, and on recommendations made to Cabinet by the Attorney General 
following consultation with the Deputy Attorney General and senior staff of the 
Department. Even though there is no evidence that superior court judges ever 
allow financial considerations to affect their judgment on the merits of a case,20 
we should not be surprised if the public were to conclude otherwise. How much 
confidence would a private litigant suing a provincial government have if the 
court’s judgment could cost the province a great deal of money? If private 
litigants and other members of the public were aware of the courts’ lack of fiscal 
independence, the legitimacy of judgments supporting a government’s position 
would be undermined.
The Royal Commission Report emphasized the need for an independent 
prosecutor, “similar to the one adopted in the Commonwealth of Australia,” to 
restore “the public’s belief that their criminal justice system is being administered 
properly and with fairness to all.”21 It is unfortunate that the Royal Commission 
did not also take the opportunity to spell out the need for independent administra­
tion of the courts. The budget processes of the High Court of Australia, the State 
of South Australia or even domestically the statutory scheme in British Columbia 
or current administrative charges in Manitoba could have been cited as examples.
16Ibid. at 118.
x9Ibid.
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Impartiality and Disqualification
The two previous sections linked independence and impartiality by raising issues 
to which contact between executive and judiciary, or dependence of the courts on 
the executive, could affect impartiality or the appearance of impartiality. The 
Marshall Case also raises questions about impartiality that focus directly on the 
way individual judges decide cases.
The Majority of the Inquiry Committee premised its argument on what it 
called the “crucial difference between an empty mind and an open one.”22
True impartiality is not so much not holding views and having opinions, but the 
capacity to prevent them from interfering with a willingness to entertain and act 
on different points of view. Whether or not a judge was biased, in our view, thus 
becomes less instructive an exercise than whether or not the judge’s decision or 
conduct reflected an incapacity to hear and decide a case with an open mind.23
Professional judges are thus expected to do what lay jurors are not: remain 
impartial in the face of prior knowledge.
In reality, this is what the public would expect of its judges. Members of the 
Bench in Nova Scotia who had not read, heard or talked about the Marshall case 
by 1982 would have displayed a grave lack of concern about the administration of 
justice in their home Province. At the same time, how can one assume that 
individuals can set aside their previously held views on so emotional and pressing 
an issue?
In other instances, this is not as difficult, because the policy preferences of a 
judge are one step removed from the case at hand. A judge may give higher 
priority to the rights of an accused than the needs of law enforcement, but must 
still consider whether the case at hand is an appropriate one for that response. 
Likewise, a judge may believe that the regulatory aims of the state should not 
hinder the conduct of private business, but must still consider whether the case at 
hand exemplifies overzealous state intervention or prudent and necessary 
regulation. The Marshall case was different. It threatened to bring preconceived 
views more directly into the process, because interested citizens and judges were 
more likely to have developed opinions about the case itself, beyond their general 
views about police practices and the treatment of native people. In this case, the 
need to consider removing oneself from participation in the case is therefore, even 
more important.
It is likely that Canadian appellate judges have long given quiet and careful
22Majority Report, supra, note 1 at 26. 
^Ibid. at 26-27.
consideration to whether they should sit on particular cases. However, since 
appellate courts usually sit in panels and rarely en banc, their due care often goes 
unnoticed. It is rare to take note of a judge’s non-participation. In contrast, the 
absence of a justice of the United States Supreme Court is always noted in that 
Court’s official reports. Justice Thurgood Marshall was even considered to be too 
circumspect when he first went on the Supreme Court in 1967 and refused to sit 
on numerous cases in which the United States was a party because he had 
previously served as Solicitor General.24
At this point, Canadian practice becomes especially worrisome. In contrast to 
the more frequent motions made in United States courts, it is extremely rare for 
a Canadian lawyer to ask that a judge remove him or herself from a case. It 
maybe is that the very rarity of this step in Canada has made it virtually anathema 
to the judiciary in this country. Justice Pace’s admonition to the Government 
solicitor cited by the Royal Commission25 may not be an unusual reaction to a 
lawyer’s intervention. Previous research into efforts by counsel to disqualify 
Supreme Court of Canada judges from sitting on appeals has uncovered only two 
instances in the history of the Court. The first, in 1957, resulted in a lawyer being 
cited for contempt amid implications about his mental health.26 The second, in 
1974, occurred during Dr. Henry Morgentaler’s first appeal to the Court, when his 
lawyer sought to disqualify Mr. Justice de Grandpré.27 The other eight justices 
unanimously ruled that their colleague did not have to step aside.28
These examples, though without the force of precedent, suggest that counsel 
in an appeal would be unlikely ever to seek the removal of a judge from a panel 
because of real or perceived bias. Canadian appellate judges have made it clear 
that on matters of impartiality, that it is their personal call. A judge may decline 
to sit, or a chief judge may decline to assign a judge to a particular panel, but the 
judges who do sit will have the protection and support of their colleagues.
Note that this discussion is limited to appellate judges. Issues surrounding the 
impartiality or bias of trial judges do not unfold in the same way. The discretion 
of a chief judge or senior judge over assignment of trial judges usually reduces the
24Thc same care, however, was not always exhibited by Justice William Rehnquist (as he then was)
after he was appointed to the United States Supreme Court. For example, see his reasons for sitting 
in Tatum v. Laird which was reopened for debate in 1986 at the time of his elevation to Chief Justice.
23Royal Commission, supra, note 3 at 126. 
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27Morgentaler v. R  (2 October 1974), S.C.C., No. 13504. J. Weber has reproduced the unanimous 
decision of the Court in his 1984 article, “The Limits to Judges’ Free Speech: A Comment on the 
Report of the Committee of Investigation into the Conduct of the Hon. Mr. Justice Berger” 29 McGill
LJ. 369, Appendix A at 405.
likelihood that a judge perceived by colleagues as less able to handle particular 
legal issues or proceedings will sit on those matters. Assignment authority is more 
likely to be exercised in terms of a judge’s subject matter expertise or previous 
experience rather than potential bias, but concern over public perception of bias 
could be a factor as well. It is not unusual for a trial judge visiting from out of 
town to find himself assigned to a case of some sensitivity in that community.
In turn, trial counsel have a more varied array of strategies to avoid trial 
judges deemed less sympathetic than their colleagues. Adjournments or elections 
then become inoffensive, albeit also inefficient, techniques to achieve the same 
result as a request for disqualification.
Given the difficulties of counsel moving to disqualify a member of an appeal 
court panel, it becomes all the more pressing for the appellate judiciary itself to 
articulate standards to govern when one ought to sit, and when one ought not to 
sit. Furthermore, it could prove a worthwhile exercise for appellate judges to 
articulate for the general public how they go about maintaining their im p artiality
These considerations are especially important since appellate judges frequently 
and legitimately base their decisions on factual premises not part of sworn 
evidence. The use of “legislative facts” in Charter29 cases is the most recent and 
dramatic manifestation of an appellate judge’s discretion to do research beyond 
the submissions of counsel, or bring to an appeal factual knowledge from outside 
the four corners of the case.
Chief Justice McEachern’s reasons, appended to the Inquiry Committee 
Report, question some of the Royal Commission’s criticisms because he feels they 
were “based upon views of law and practice that do not accord with principles of 
appellate procedure generally accepted in the common law world.”30 
McEachern’s criticism of the three experienced trial judges who made up the 
Royal Commission underlines the need to give special consideration to how 
appellate judges make decisions: how they incorporate non-legal findings, how 
they maintain an open mind, how they structure their deliberations and how they 
decide what to include and exclude from their written reasons.
These are questions no judge in Canada can be required to answer. They 
allow a range of acceptable conduct so wide that no judge need reasonably fear 
discipline or removal. The Inquiry Committee’s test for determining inappropriate 
judicial conduct was to ask whether the alleged conduct is of a nature or type that
2AThe Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule
B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
is “manifestly and profoundly destructive.”31 However, this broad discretion 
carries with it a strong requirement for sensitive and responsible exercise of 
judicial power.
Limitations on Learning From the Past
Researchers are restricted at present in their ability to help appellate judges 
develop informed approaches to the exercise of judicial power. Not only are 
current deliberations kept secret, but so are deliberations of the past. When the 
papers of former United States Supreme Court justices have been archived and 
made available, scholars have found fascinating records of judicial strategy32 and 
judicial deliberations.33 But the public papers of former Supreme Court of 
Canada justices contain no evidence whatsoever of the Court’s deliberative 
enterprise.
Ironically, the result has been quite the opposite of what the justices might 
have hoped. If former justices expected that shielding the Court’s deliberations 
from public view in perpetuity would enhance public respect for the judiciary, they 
are wrong. When David Ricardo Williams wrote his excellent and sympathetic 
biography of Chief Justice Lyman Duff, he was able to draw on Duffs extensive 
correspondence with Ottawa politicians, in which he offered unsolicited advice 
about how they should conduct their business. However, Williams was unable to 
tell us how the historic judgments of Duffs tenure came to be made and written. 
As Professor William Kaplan writes the first biography of Justice Ivan Rand, he 
will have access to a wide variety of archival material dealing with Rand’s activities 
off the Bench, but nothing about his influence over some of the Supreme Court’s 
greatest civil liberties judgments. What a shame that today’s appellate judges 
cannot draw on the lessons their predecessors could teach. We place so many 
burdens on our judiciary and give them so much latitude within which to work that 
they deserve more opportunities to learn than they have been given. One can only 
hope that a newly-retired generation of justices will be more helpful.
^Majority Report, supra, note 1 at 27.
32See W.Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
^Many judicial biographies have been written that have looked at a particular judge’s deliberative 
processes. For an interesting look at judicial strategizing see Howard J. Woodford, Jr., Mr. Justice 
Murphy: A Political Biography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). For a similar example 
in an intermediate court of appeal, see Marvin Schick’s history of the Second Circuit, Learned Hand’s 
Court (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1970).
